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Vietnam at the Khmer Frontier: Boundary Politics, 1802–1847  
 




This article addresses the challenging spatial organization of Nguyễn Vietnam: the binary 
relationship between civilizational expansion and the construction of a state boundary at the 
Khmer frontier. It examines the process whereby the Vietnamese moved southwest into the 
Khmer world and territorialized a contested terrain as part of a civilizational and imperial project. 
The process employed the state’s administrative infrastructure and cultural institutions to erase 
ethnic, political, and cultural diversity in the lower Mekong. This article argues that Vietnamese 
expansion was not simply an attempt to carry out the will of heaven and Confucian cultural 
responsibility; rather, it was a search for peripheral security and a response to regional 
competition. In fact, the seesawing between civilizational mission and territorial consolidation 
confused the Nguyễn bureaucracy with regard to Cambodia’s political and cultural status and 
affected Hue’s frontier management. As a result, the Vietnam-Cambodia boundary was the 
object of frequent shifts and negotiations. Only after facing Siamese invasion and experiencing 
fierce Khmer resistance did the Vietnamese court gradually replace its civilizational perspective 
with a more practical approach to border management, out of which emerged the modern 
borderline. 
 




For the early Nguyễn emperor Gia Long (r. 1802–1820), who emerged victorious from three 
decades of war following two centuries of division, and his heir, Minh Mệnh (r. 1820–1841), 
several urgent priorities were to unify Vietnam, extend the reach of the state, and secure the 
country’s borders, which entailed gaining control over both land and people. Debates at court 
about how to achieve these goals were couched in the rhetoric of a civilizing mission, on the one 
hand, and in calls to protect the empire’s borders, on the other. This article examines the 
dynamic relationship between these two modes of thought—one focused on people and the other 
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on land—with particular reference to Minh Mệnh’s abortive expansion into Cambodia in the 
1830s. The interplay between an expansionist, civilizing mission and demands for territorial 
consolidation had a major impact on the geography of the Vietnamese southwest well before 
colonial rule. 
 Two concepts previously employed to describe Minh Mệnh’s failed project— 
“Vietnamization” and “regional competition”—partially capture the dynamic relationship among 
the politics of cultural expansion, contests for regional hegemony, and shifting geography; 
however, they do not trace Huế’s evolving spatial imagination, especially the construction of a 
geographical consciousness through the project (Chandler 1974; Rungswasdisab 1995; Choi 
2004a).1 This centralizing state projection not only collected topographical knowledge but also 
created knowledge about political subjects in the service of extending governance to the frontier 
of the empire by “graphing space, or producing an ethnographic picture” of the landscape (Davis 
2015, 338). The commingling of two discursive modes—civilizing mission and territorial 
consolidation—confused Nguyễn officials with regard to Cambodia’s political and cultural 
status and affected the court’s ability to design a consistent policy for the frontier. How it was 
imagined depended not only on the perceived sociocultural character of the frontier, but also, 
and more importantly, on the court’s desire to ensure border security.  
 Both Minh Mệnh and his son Thiệu Trị (r. 1841–1847) struggled between imperial 
ambition and the limits of their state’s capacity for expansion. Enthusiastically invoking the 
Confucian mission to civilize the frontier, Minh Mệnh abolished the Cambodian monarchy in 
1834 and turned the kingdom into Vietnam’s thirty-second province as the Western 
Commandery (Trấn Tây). But even Minh Mệnh recognized the limits of the court’s military 
capabilities. When, after defeating a Siamese invasion in 1834, the governor of Hà Tiên 
submitted a proposal to extend military campaigns beyond the Khmer land into Siam, Minh 
Mệnh replied: “If we bring an army from far away to invade, can we be assured of victory? Even 
if we win, can we settle in their land? Can we command their people? Even if we could settle in 
their land and command their people, could we be sure that order would prevail over one 
hundred years? Therefore, is there any reason for sending soldiers to this far-flung boundary?”2  
 By the time Thiệu Trị came to the throne in 1841, the tide had turned in favor of Siam in 
the confrontation over Cambodia. Reports from Phnom Penh revealed that “the rebels are 
everywhere, forming forts, settling on strategic grounds, and using those tactics to fight back. 
From the beginning, we [Nguyễn troops] have been able only to attack [the Cambodians] along 
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riverbanks and in the vicinity of their forts, while leaving their major bases untouched.… 
Therefore, the enemies are still free, never exhausted.”3 Those who faced the Khmer and 
Siamese directly in battle had become increasingly pessimistic about the court’s ability to 
maintain Cambodia’s status as a Vietnamese province. Instead of speaking of a moral mission to 
civilize an ambiguous and contested space, they demanded the construction of a practical, solid, 
and fixed border. Realizing that his father’s self-imposed civilizing mission threatened the 
security of his empire, Thiệu Trị yielded to their advice and ignored calls to pursue his father’s 
expansionist agenda.  
 
Contested Ground   
 The Vietnamese and Thai had competed for supremacy along the Mekong River since 
the fifteenth century. Acting on behalf of the Nguyễn lords who ruled the Southern Realm 
(Cochinchina) from 1600 until their demise in 1775, Nguyễn Cư Trinh (1716–1767), the chief 
architect of the eighteenth-century expansion into the lower Mekong, pursued a policy of 
gradually annexing Khmer land. This resulted in the intermingling of Vietnamese, Chinese, 
Siamese, and Khmer people and a fluid cultural and political environment. The lower Mekong 
region in the eighteenth century has been described as “borderless, centerless, polyglot, multi-
ethnic and multicultural” (Cooke and Tana 2004, 5–8). 
 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Cambodian central plain was the last 
space of contestation between the two centralizing states on the mainland, Vietnam and Siam 
(Trocki 2009, 339). The death in 1809 of Mạc Tử Thiêm, the last in a century-long line of Mạc 
quasi-satraps in the port of Hà Tiên (which had once served the Cambodian district of Banteay 
Meas), gave Gia Long the opportunity to end the Mạc clan’s hereditary rule over the port and to 
bring it into the regular Vietnamese administrative structure. With the end of Hà Tiên’s 
autonomous status, Cambodia became both site of contestation and buffer between Siam and 
Vietnam. Vietnamese were moving west in large numbers; it was thus only a matter of time 
before several isolated Khmer areas in An Giang, Bến Tre, and Tây Ninh were incorporated 
under Vietnamese control. One of Gia Long’s first major actions was to deploy an army to 
Phnom Penh in 1813 and appoint a governor-general to oversee Cambodian affairs in support of 
King Ang Chan (1792–1834) against Siam.  
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The Rhetoric of Civility and Barbarism 
 In his seminal book Siam Mapped (1994), Thai historian Thongchai Winichakul argued 
that “the spatial discourse of siwilai (civilization) was a comparative geography of civilization, 
given that ‘geography’ can mean not only the arrangement of actual space and knowledge of it, 
but also the knowledge and discourses whose effects subsequently constitute spatial practices” 
(2000, 529). A significant aspect of nineteenth-century Siamese expansion was the “forced 
migration of local people to resettle in the Siamese-controlled area” (Rungswasdisab 2014). 
Siamese policy thus resulted in the movement of border populations into settled and culturally 
dependable areas. The Huế court dealt with the frontier differently: besides sending people out 
from the core to new areas (rather than away from them) and establishing administrative 
institutions, Huế also sought to convert local people to “civility.” 
 Nineteenth-century Vietnamese divided the world into three spaces: the core, the frontier, 
and the region of the “distant peoples.” The inhabitants of these different spaces were the targets 
of different political and cultural projects, namely civilization through education (giáo hóa), 
pacification of the periphery (phủ biên), and accommodation of the distant people (nhu viễn).4 
Boundary definition among those categories would determine policy. Following Chinese ideas, 
the Vietnamese distinguished between hoa (civilized) people, among whom they counted 
themselves, and man di (barbarians); this distinction dictated their position in the world order. 
The hoa resided in the central core, or Middle Kingdom, which is “where wise men live, where 
the vital energy of everything concentrates, where sages teach people, where benevolence reigns, 
where poetry, writing, rituals, and music flourish, extraordinary talent is prized, where outsiders 
admire, and where barbarians follow” (Wang 2008, 131). Terms that Vietnamese used to signify 
their civilization’s glory included hoa and văn hiến. Employing a different discourse than the 
modern concept of civilization, văn hiến simply signified the existence of institutional records 
(văn) and of wise men (hiến). As such, it was a powerful claim to intellectual development and 
political superiority. In 1368, the founding Ming emperor bestowed on Vietnam the title “Realm 
of Manifest Civility” (Văn hiến chi bang) on the occasion of a tributary delegation’s journey to 
the Chinese capital (Nguyễn Trãi 1435, 30 a/b). In the following centuries, the Vietnamese elite 
repeatedly deployed the term as a source of cultural pride. In 1831, when Qing officials 
characterized Vietnam as “barbarian” (di), the Nguyễn envoy, Lý Văn Phức, protested that his 
country was actually văn hiến (Lý Văn Phức 1831, 24b–25a).  
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 Of particular concern regarding Cambodia was the Vietnamese view on the utility of 
buffer zones and on the importance of the barbarian periphery to the civilized core. This view 
was articulated by Hoàng Kim Hoán, vice-minister of the Ministry of Personnel, after Bangkok 
annexed Vientiane in 1827:  
 
Recently, after Siam invaded Lanxang [Vientiane kingdom], some court officials 
proposed that we should ignore Lanxang’s predicament and wait until Siam 
transgresses our boundary to strike back. I personally consider that Nghệ An is 
the backbone of our kingdom; beyond is Trà Lân, which borders Lanxang. Thus, 
Lanxang is our shield; it should not be abandoned. If the Siamese are waging this 
campaign [merely] to assuage their anger by looting property and kidnapping 
women, then there is nothing to be said. However, if they conquer garrisons and 
towns and oppress the people of Lanxang, it will be tantamount to destroying our 
shield. Even though they do not expand into our barbarian vassals’ lands, our 
vassal barbarians will be close to them [Siamese], and naturally will become their 
dependents. If our barbarian vassals become their servants, unavoidably Trà Lân, 
which now belongs to us, will be lost to them.5  
 
The Khmer world’s position in the geocultural schema of core, periphery, and distant lands 
shifted dramatically during the early nineteenth century, and Cambodia appeared in all three 
spatial and cultural categories. In Abstracts of Minh Mệnh’s Policies (MMCY), the Khmer land 
was recorded in both the section of “pacified frontiers” (quyển 24) and that of “accommodated 
distant peoples” (quyển 25). In the Official Compendium of Institutions and Usages of Imperial 
Vietnam, Cambodia was listed as a tributary, while Siam, Western countries, and Myanmar 
formed a separate entry of “distant peoples” (quyển 132–136). Following the invasion of 
Cambodia in 1834, Minh Mệnh declared:  
 
Chân Lạp [Chenla/Cambodia] is now incorporated in the map of Vietnam. I 
therefore want to reorganize it into prefectures and districts and to teach its 
people. However, its customs are different; to pacify people and seek their 
submission, we cannot rely on laws and rules alone. Only by introducing 
governmental institutions and gradually inserting them [into local society], can 
their old manners be changed.6  
 
When, in 1837, the Bureau of Astronomical Observatory drafted a record of weather description 
for different regions in which Cambodia appeared under its original name, Chân Lạp, Minh 
Mệnh reacted angrily, stating, “Cambodia was established as the Western Commandery; there is 
no one who is not aware of that.” He ordered the mistake corrected and the chief officials of the 
bureau punished.7  
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The binarism of (sinicized) civilization and barbarity profoundly influenced Minh 
Mệnh’s peripheral policies. To him, ethnographic distinctiveness was irrelevant. His new name 
for the empire, the Great South (Đại Nam), dropped the Viet identity and focused on the 
differentiation between the northern and southern empires, between the civilized and the 
barbarians:  
 
Trương Minh Giảng often told me that the Khmers are mostly simple and 
trustworthy, perhaps better than the Thổ people in the north. I don’t believe so. 
Among the Thổ people in the north, some are literate and fluent in the Viet 
language, and therefore can be educated. The Khmer are as thick as balls of mud 
and know nothing. Most of them, moreover, are cunning and deceitful. Even if 
one tries to pour advice into their ears and teach them, it cannot be done. I 
predicted what happens today. Luckily our country is now prosperous. [If] we 
lack soldiers, we can recruit more; [if] we lack grain, we can provide more. There 
will be a hard campaign before we can bring order [to the Khmer]. This great task 
should take place in my reign rather than be left for my sons and grandsons. 8    
 
This civilizational rhetoric was celebrated among Confucian literati. An official reported from 
Phnom Penh that  
 
since our ancestral sages began to open it up, it has now become a superior 
civilized country [văn minh thượng quốc] that can be compared equally with Min 
[Fujian] and Guang [Guangdong and Guangxi]. The spread of good customs is 
one thing, but a brilliant leader is also essential to open the land up, and then to 
civilize uncouth people with writing, to cover fish scales with clothing, to turn 
unhealthy air into good, and to transform barbarians into Hoa [Vietnamese].9   
 
Following the establishment of the Western Commandery in 1834, Minh Mệnh 
proclaimed that Cambodians would be called “new subjects” (tân dân) and launched a 
systematic civilizational project.10 He sent a secret edict to the chief Vietnamese officials in the 
Western Commandery, ordering them to integrate Vietnamese and Khmer socially and culturally 
so that Cambodians could “acquire Viet customs and absorb the imperial grace soon”; the 
officials were to “use Viet customs to transform barbarian manners.”11 In practice, the expansion 
of the space of (Vietnamese) civilization relied on two main components: the mobilization of 
vagrants, criminals, rebels, Chinese migrants, and landless peasants to bring new land into 
cultivation or to settle in already inhabited areas, on the one hand, and, on the other, to force the 
native populations to adopt Vietnamese cultural norms—from funerary rites to clothing and 
hairstyles. The Nguyễn rulers’ transforming zeal was not limited to “barbarians.” In 1839, Minh 
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Mệnh decreed that women in the north should stop wearing skirts in the local style in favor of 
Chinese-style trousers (southern women had already made the switch a century earlier) (Cadière 
1915). Ten years earlier, he had approved a memorial to forbid Chinese from shaving their heads 
and wearing the [Manchu] queue.12 But in Cambodia, the pursuit of cultural conformity was far 
more sweeping and comprehensive, leading later to accusations of cultural genocide (see, for 
instance, Moses 2008). 
 
Blurred Boundaries  
Although the notions of a civilizational frontier and state boundary coexisted in Nguyễn 
political ideology, they pointed to different modes of classifying people, politicizing the 
landscape, and demarcating geography. In order to govern, states control populations through 
regulation, often by creating different ethnic categories and administrative units. In an 
intermediate zone, such as the western bank of the Hậu River (Bassac), the lines between these 
different categories were extremely hard to define and maintain.  
Before the nineteenth century, the Khmer world was part of a premodern “galactic polity” 
structure of complex and fragile relationships between the lower groups (Khmer Krom), who 
lived downstream (Water Chenla/Cambodia), and the upper groups (Land Chenla/Cambodia) 
since the Tang period (Nguyễn 1900, 46a; Tambiah 1976, 134–137). A thirteenth-century Yuan 
record showed areas along the Lower Mekong as generally empty of people and filled with 
extensive tracts of swampy forests and water buffaloes (Zhou 1981, section on “Rivers and 
Mountains”). The Khmer land suffered a demographic decline after the collapse of Angkor in 
1431, and the capital frequently shifted southward among Udong, Lovek, and Phnom Penh. 
From the seventeenth century onward, the Khmer world in the Lower Mekong was an unstable 
space of intruders and emerging autonomous powers. The flat and swampy terrain was a 
landscape of intermingling settlements and ever-changing human networks.  
          The loose political networks of the Khmer groups located in the lower region made them 
vulnerable to foreign penetration, starting with the Vietnamese in the 1620s. For the Nguyễn 
lords in Huế, “There is no way to the west, and it is too hard to go north; therefore, we should do 
our best to advance to the south” (Nguyễn Cư Trinh 1750, 56–57). Heading south, they turned 
the Lower Mekong into a major arena of contestation with Siam and a “meeting point between 
savagery and civilization” (Turner ([1920]) 1948, 3). Vietnamese moving southward and 
Chinese fleeing the Qing conquest of China gradually captured strategic economic grounds, 
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especially along the Gia Định-Hà Tiên corridor (Nguyễn Văn Hầu 1970: 3–24). After failed 
attempts in 1739 to recapture Hà Tiên (whose Mạc ruler had submitted to the Nguyễn in 1708), 
Phnom Penh was never again able to organize a military campaign to defend its southeastern 
frontier.  
            Nguyễn Cư Trinh’s 1753–1756 campaigns reached deep into the Khmer land of 
Cambodia and promoted Hà Tiên’s dramatic expansion with territorial annexation. The newly 
established corridor became a stepping-stone for Vietnamese to cross the Tiền River. As a result, 
Trà Vinh and Ba Thắc, together with three additional administrative units—Đông Khẩu (Sa 
Đéc), Tân Châu (An Giang), and Châu Đốc (Hậu Giang)—were incorporated into the Nguyễn 
domain.13 Hà Tiên annexed five other Cambodian prefectures, allowing Vietnamese influence to 
reach the Cà Mau peninsula and the southern Cambodian coast.14 Along that coast, in present-
day Koh Kong Province, Siamese and Vietnamese troops were stationed in intermingled 
settlements. This area was ceded to Hà Tiên by Cambodia in 1757 (and remained under 
Vietnamese control until the reign of Tự Đức [1847–1883]) (Tống and Dương [1810] 2013, 24 
n4).  
Bangkok’s own need for international trade and resources in its wars against Myanmar 
also led it to take great interest in Cambodia. Dramatic consolidation of the periphery brought 
Siamese troops to the eastern bank of the Mekong River. They incorporated the Lao kingdoms 
of Vientiane and Champassak and the Cambodian provinces of Battambang and Siem Reap into 
Siam’s direct administration (Rungswasdisab 1995, 13, 51–64). Caught between the two 
expansionist empires, local Khmer chiefs sought a measure of autonomy by paying tribute to 
both Huế and Bangkok. Cambodia’s status as vassal to two overlords (muang song fai fa) was 
recognized by Siam, which called itself “father” while Vietnam was “mother” (Chotmaihet 
ratchakan 1812; Phraratchaniphon phrabat 1968, 14). 
As Siam and Vietnam penetrated deeply into the Khmer land in Siem Reap, Battambang, 
the Cardamom Mountain, the southern coast, and Hà Tiên, state boundaries rarely remained 
fixed. Since the time of Phraya Taksin (r. 1767–1782), Siamese troops had been stationed along 
the Cambodian coast west of Hà Tiên (Sài Mạt Prefecture). In 1810, following the incorporation 
of Hà Tiên into the Vietnamese administrative structure, Emperor Gia Long asked Rama II to 
remove those soldiers for the Nguyễn to recapture Sài Mạt (Tống and Dương [1810] 1966, 6).15 
That same year, Vietnamese troops appeared in Can Bot (Kampot) and established military posts 
in places mostly inhabited by Khmers. Siamese soldiers were reportedly stationed not far, at the 
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Prek Tiek Sap estuary. To protect those areas, Huế reinforced Hà Tiên and islands in the Gulf of 
Siam. Military posts on Phú Quốc Island protected the sea-lane between Siam and southern 
Vietnam, a strategic corridor for all naval campaigns in the region (Tống and Dương 1966, 39–
40). 
Increasing Siamese intervention in Cambodia alarmed Gia Long. He designed a 
boundary guarded by a local army to master the natural terrain and implemented a defensive 
system with military posts and forts.16 After officials were dispatched to map the area around 
Châu Đốc, three thousand Vietnamese soldiers and two thousand Khmers were recruited in 
building the garrison. In Gia Long’s words, the defensive network was intended to “protect Hà 
Tiên and support Phnom Penh.”17 In 1819, he ordered Hà Tiên’s army chief to measure the 
distance between Hà Tiên and Châu Đốc and map the topography.18 His new project, the Vĩnh 
Tế canal, would fundamentally transform the natural and political landscape of the region. Gia 
Long realized that “Vĩnh Thanh and Hà Tiên border Cambodia; commercial and official 
transportation cannot rely on maritime routes; therefore, there is a need to utilize the Châu Đốc 
River, to dig a canal to promote transportation.” 19 Along with the completion of the 87-
kilometer-long Vĩnh Tế canal, Phú Quốc was incorporated into Hà Tiên’s administration, and 
travel that once took days at sea was drastically shortened. Other canal projects between the 
1810s and the 1830s helped push the Vietnamese state further into the Khmer world. The water 
channels not only provided transportation, aided communication, reclaimed land for agriculture, 
and promoted the establishment of villages but also formed defensive lines protecting the settlers 
and the frontier army. Nguyễn Văn Thụy (Nguyễn Văn Thoại in southern spelling, 1761–1829) 
describes their achievements:  
 
I followed imperial instructions, worked hard and carefully, recruited people to 
establish villages; depending on the terrain: [I created] one route to the long river; 
one route going up to Sốc Vinh, and another to Lò Gò; I pacified the people, 
established villages, reclaimed land for rice fields and orchards. Although it does 
not wholly fulfill my expectations, in comparison to the old days, much progress 
has been achieved. The soil at the foot of the mountain is free of wild grass and 
thorns; bamboos grow bright green; the landscape [of Sam Mountain] is beautiful. 
The landscape is no less beautiful than that of the Central Land (Trung Châu). (in 
Nguyễn Văn Hầu 1970, 12–13). 
 
Connecting a large area from Hà Tiên through the Seven Mountains (An Giang) to Châu Đốc, 
the Vĩnh Tế canal represented a challenge to Siam’s territorial ambitions. In their own 
campaigns of 1833–1834, Siamese troops even made an effort to fill the canal but failed against 
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the large Vietnamese naval forces. Still, Vietnamese settlements along the canal were frequent 
targets of Siamese campaigns that sought to demolish Vietnamese bases, capture Vietnamese 
settlers in Cambodia, and send them to Bangkok. Siam’s chief general, Chao Phraya Bodidecha, 
ordered the Thai troops in Hà Tiên, Kampot, and Kampong Som to “evacuate the people, burn 
down the houses in every town, and demolish the town, so that only the forest and the rivers are 
left” (Rungswasdisab 1995, 98–99). 
 
Like Silkworms Eating Mulberry Leaves 
Thongchai suggests three dimensions of territoriality: “a form of classification by area, a 
form of communication by boundary, and an attempt at enforcing” (1994, 16). Early nineteenth-
century Vietnam experienced the construction of all of these elements along the Vietnam-
Cambodia contact zone. After defeating a Siamese invasion in 1833–1834, the Vietnamese 
reached close to Battambang, posing a direct threat to Bangkok; however, their failure to put 
down Cambodian rebellions caused them to withdraw from Phnom Penh, and the boundary 
moved back to the Vĩnh Tế canal. A Siamese military report confirmed the appearance of 
Vietnamese garrisons along the west bank of the Mekong River stretching from Kampong Svai, 
to Kampong Thom, Staung, Pursat, and Kampong Chnang. The garrisons connected with the 
military network in the south and southwest in Hà Tiên, Kampot, and Kampong Som, and from 
Châu Đốc to Phnom Penh (Chotmaihet ruang thap 1933, 9). The post of Châu Đốc guarded the 
entrance to Vĩnh Tế and therefore was not only the gateway to Hà Tiên but also, more 
importantly, controlled the Mekong River and marked the boundary between lower and upper 
Khmer. In 1832, it formed the major center for the establishment of the frontier province, An 
Giang. Following the Siamese invasion and Khmer rebellion, the Châu Đốc garrison was 
enlarged and became the biggest military base along the Vietnam-Cambodia frontier. The 
governor of An Giang also oversaw Cambodian affairs.  
Warfare among Cambodians, Siamese, Vietnamese, and overseas Chinese had a 
profound impact on the traditional networks of kinship, tribute, patronage, and vassalage in the 
contested space of the Lower Khmer world. Each side competed fiercely in building its own 
infrastructure and destroying the other’s. Every time they left Phnom Penh, the Siamese “took 
everything away, and burned what had been people’s houses, until not one remained; they took 
away everyone’s possessions, masters’ and slaves’ alike, and they carried off all the people until 
not one man was left” (Chandler 2008, 38). When the Vietnamese returned, their priority was 
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always to build moats, canal, wells, ponds, garrisons, and ramparts (Chandler 2008, 38). A 
Siamese map of the lower Mekong (Muang Phrataphang in Thai) shows intermingling Khmer 
and Vietnamese sites with the note that “the damned Vietnamese burnt this village” (Phasuk and 
Stott 2004, 27). These interwoven Vietnamese and Khmer administrative zones broke up the 
landscape into small isolated areas. Established along strategic water channels, the Vietnamese 
were able to control transportation networks between the upper and lower Khmer lands, 
“separating [those living in the Lower Mekong] from the king and his senior officials” in the 
political center upstream.20  Their isolation rendered them even more vulnerable to Vietnamese 
expansion. Vietnam, however, faced enormous challenges in penetrating further into the Khmer 
world. It gained territory “bit by bit,” like “silkworms eating mulberry leaves” (tàm thực).21 
Besides having to contend with the resistance of local populations and Siamese forces, 
the Vietnamese were operating in an unfamiliar landscape of mountains, valleys, lakes, river 
islands, and swamp stretching from the Khorat Plateau in southern Laos to the Mekong estuaries, 
in which traditional wet-rice cultivation and village-based social organization could not emerge 
naturally without massive state involvement and military protection. A major obstacle to 
colonizing the swampy plains was the hydraulic extent of the Long Xuyên Quadrangle into 
Cambodia and the river ports of Châu Đốc and Long Xuyên, and into the two seaports of Hà 
Tiên and Rạch Giá. These were the only channels capable of releasing water before any 
infrastructure could be built (Biggs 2010, 18). The Long Xuyên Quadrangle and the Plain of 
Reeds (Đồng Tháp Mười) were “the two areas that caused the most angst for nation-building” 
(Biggs 2010, 18). 
 The Plain of Reeds is a vast wetland depression of about 13,000 square kilometers 
encompassing the modern provinces of Đồng Tháp and Tiền Giang (Vietnam) and parts of Svay 
Reang (Cambodia). It lies in a flat lowland region subject to seasonal flooding between July and 
December. At the peak of the flooding, between September and the end of October, the plain 
effectively becomes a vast lake, with some areas flooded to a depth of nearly 4 meters, while it 
suffers severe drought during the dry season. On the western bank of the Hậu River is the Long 
Xuyên Quadrangle (Kiên Giang, An Giang, and Cần Thơ). The area of 489,000 hectares is 
marked by the present-day Vietnamese-Cambodian borderline, the coastline along the Gulf of 
Siam, and the Hậu River (see map 1). Like the Plain of Reeds, this land is flooded annually to a 
depth of 0.5–2.5 meters during the rainy season, while it experiences drought and soil 
salinization from the rising seawater during the dry months (Stearling, Hurley, and Le 2006, 
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271). Australian anthropologist Philip Taylor argues that the varied natural terrain is not only 
responsible for forming seven distinct Khmer-populated subregions, but also that the 
intersection between a high floodplain, a vast swamp, and the coastal strip dotted with forested 
limestone mountains (from An Giang to Hà Tiên) functioned as a topographical barrier against 
the Vietnamese (Taylor 2014, chaps. 5 and 6).  
In order to move into Cambodia, the Vietnamese had to establish a political and 
economic base over these two floodplains.  Labor shortages and unfamiliarity with techniques of 
flood control (different from the traditional dyke construction of northern Vietnam) hindered 
their advance. Khmer uprisings made the task more difficult. It took several decades to increase 
the number of Vietnamese settlers and guarantee their steady progress against local populations. 
(The flow of Vietnamese and Chinese into the region eventually increased significantly under 
French colonial rule between 1860 and 1920 and profoundly transformed the region’s landscape 
demographically and economically [Engelbert 2007].) 
 
Defending the Border 
As premodern Southeast Asian polities practiced the politics of manpower rather than of 
land (Scott 2009, 65), fixed geography was not as significant as controlling and mobilizing 
people. The Nguyễn court, however, had its own strategy for expanding its territory by sending 
Vietnamese to the margins of the empire. Although 40,000 households were registered in Gia 
Định and surrounding areas in the eighteenth century, they were far outnumbered by the Khmers 
(Lê Quý Đôn 1973, quyển I: 37b–38a). The difficulties of state building and the struggle 
between Viet and non-Viet in the lower Mekong posed a major challenge to Huế (Choi 2004a, 
129–159). In 1819, there were 1,500 đinh (registered males between the ages of 18 and 60) in 
Hà Tiên.22 Five years later (in 1824), their numbers were down to 668 đinh, distributed among 
thirty-seven villages; they collectively owned 348 plots of rice fields. The garrison of Hà Tiên 
was organized into five units of 250 soldiers.23  
In 1822, a Commission of Education was appointed, a signal that the imperial margin 
was now to be culturally integrated. The new immigrants formed an additional district (Hà Tiên 
huyện) with two communes, all placed under the authority of Gia Định. In 1826, Hà Tiên and 
two other districts (Long Xuyên and Kiên Giang) formed a new prefecture, An Biên, which 
literally means “pacified frontier.”24 In order to reinforce Hà Tiên as a bulwark for the 
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southwestern frontier, Minh Mệnh ordered local officials to draft a plan of agricultural and 
demographic expansion:  
 
The emperor observes that Hà Tiên is broad. But rice land is still limited and 
unexplored and villages are scarce. Therefore, he wants to launch a campaign to 
reclaim land in order to expand resources and support the population. [He] sent 
Gia Định officials instructions from three court departments to work out a plan 
for employing vagrants to till the uncultivated land, establish villages, cultivate 
fields, and plant mulberry for the benefit of many generations to come.25 
 
  Setting up plantations became an increasingly significant part of that strategy. Doing so 
would not only bring new land into cultivation under Vietnamese control but also provide 
foodstuff for soldiers. In 1835, Minh Mệnh ordered the Ministry of Defense: 
 
Hà Tiên has various resources and the current situation is peaceful. Thus, we 
instruct Governor Trần Chấn to follow the ancient mode of plantation, select 
arable land, and provide soldiers with buffaloes and agricultural tools, so that 
those soldiers can both cultivate the land and practice military skills. Those crops 
are to be distributed to the troops for one or two years; afterward those lands will 
become rice fields and the crops will be used as military grain. It is a long-term 
policy in which the state does not need to provide monthly rice rations, but only 
salary.26 
  
The policy also covered poor farmers and vagrants in Kiên Giang and Hà Châu; they were given 
buffaloes and rice seed to exploit the uncultivated land.27  
Huế’s aim was to strengthen the military structures with civilian ones.28 These defense 
networks not only represented the institutionalization of state building but also served to imprint 
Vietnamese geographical identity at the frontier. Minh Mệnh’s instructions to the Ministry of 
Treasury were to create dense Vietnamese settlements along the boundary. These settlements 
were considered the best tools of state expansion:  
 
Châu Đốc is a strategic land at the boundary. [I] previously asked Nguyễn Văn 
Thụy to recruit people to reclaim land and establish villages, by offering them 
money for capital and rice. Many times, I offered them an extension when they 
could not pay back [what they owed]. If they still could not, I exempted them 
from repayment. In truth, I want the land not to be left wild and my subjects to 
have employment in order to have people to protect the boundary. This is 
important for protecting the frontier; I don’t even care for revenue from land 
taxes.29 
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Large numbers of convicts were sent to Hà Tiên and An Giang to work on military plantations. 
They were encouraged to settle permanently along the frontier “as a strategy to keep the 
boundary populated.”30 
At first, attempts to settle Vietnamese subjects along the frontier did not work well. The 
Viet colonizers were too few to overcome the Khmer numerically and they were scattered over a 
vast and varied terrain. Moreover, they preferred to engage in trade and associated work instead 
of working in fields. The governor of An Giang Province complained to Minh Mệnh: 
 
The land in the Six Southern Provinces is fertile. The only problem is the 
engrained laziness of people who mostly work on boat transportation and leave 
the fertile lands to the wilderness. River transport is harmful to agriculture, as 
wild grass is harmful to rice. In addition, before, commercial boats to Phnom 
Penh were subject to taxation, but not those within the Six Provinces. Therefore, 
[I] ask for an order that from this tenth month onward, trading ships should be 
carefully checked and classified, issued certificates, and subjected to taxation; in 
this way, those who have taken up lowly jobs (mạt nghệ) will resume agricultural 
work.31 
 
Despite official complaints, both Hà Tiên and An Giang eventually grew rapidly during 
the 1830s. Hà Tiên’s jurisdiction extended over one prefecture and three districts; An Giang 
included two prefectures and four districts. The population of Hà Tiên and An Giang reached 
23,000 đinh, according to an 1838 state survey. In Châu Đốc alone, an 1830 report by Gia Định 
officials reported forty-one villages and 800 đinh. After nearly two decades (in the early 1850s), 
An Giang Province had a population of roughly 23,000 đinh. 32  Increasing demographic 
mobilization and settlement were greatly assisted by the construction of infrastructure along the 
Khmer frontier. Among the new infrastructure, military plantations (đồn điền) played an 
essential role; not accidentally, they grew dramatically during the 1850s, as the Nguyễn state 
was able to employ not only soldiers and convicts but also southern landowners, peasants, 
Chinese immigrants, and Khmers (Choi 2004b; Taylor 2014, 183). This essentially transformed 
the frontier landscape where Vietnam could control strategic transport routes and major 
economic centers. It ranked among the Nguyễn’s most successful state projects in constructing 
its boundary with Cambodia. By designing a new human landscape, Huế legitimized its claim 
over a new territory, and in fact put it under steady governance.  
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Map 1. Map of the Lower Mekong. Source: Cooke and Tana (2004, 136). 
 
Communication and Defense  
Garrisons, guardhouses, canals, and Vietnamese villages became distinctive visual 
markers of the Huế-controlled geography. The Nguyễn gave special attention to shoring up the 
communication system and defensive structures from Hà Tiên to Tây Ninh (which was 
established in 1836). Officials in Hà Tiên were sending monthly reports on the frontier situation 
to Huế.33 To facilitate those communications by both land and water, a massive infrastructure 
was built during the reign of Minh Mệnh. In 1835, he aimed to set up overland transportation 
throughout the southern provinces, reaching Phnom Penh for the first time. Châu Đốc became 
connected to Vĩnh Long by a new 114-kilometer road, while other routes linked Châu Đốc with 
Hà Tiên, the Vĩnh Tế bank, and Phnom Penh. A postal system was added along those routes.34 
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Forts in Hà Tiên and Châu Đốc were reinforced in preparation for warfare and to suppress local 
resistance. To the walls built under the Mạc in the early eighteenth century, new fortifications 
were added in Hà Tiên, with cannons at Kim Dữ Mountain. When, in 1833, the size of Châu 
Đốc fort was found insufficient to launch large military campaigns into the Cambodian plain, the 
court ordered a new fort to be built in Long Son. This location not only better overlooked the 
Mekong but also was well connected to Hà Tiên (84 kilometers), Phnom Penh (102 kilometers), 
and Vĩnh Long (111 kilometers).35 Along the Vĩnh Tế canal, a considerable number of military 
stations were established as bulwarks against Khmer penetration, especially during the 1840s 
rebellion.  
The Khmers had to rely on the canal to organize their resistance, because it went through 
some of their most important population centers. Nguyễn Tri Phương sent a memorial in 1841 
with a proposal for blocking the Khmer influx across the frontier by setting up forts and 
guardhouses in Tiên Nông, Vĩnh Thông, Vĩnh Gia, and Vinh Điều along the canal. In addition, 
prisoners and vagrants were divided into groups of fifty to form villages along its bank. The 
settlers had their tax reduced and were given free access to virgin land and the possibility of 
establishing villages under military supervision.36 Those communities played a crucial role in 
the Nguyễn’s suppression of the Khmer revolt by cutting off the lower Khmer from the 
patronage of Phnom Penh. The centers of Khmer resistance in the Seven Mountains, Ba Xuyên, 
were gradually isolated. When a new canal system linking the Tiền and Hậu Rivers came into 
effect in 1844, Hồng Ngự, Tân Châu, Châu Đốc, Hà Tiên, and the Gulf of Siam all became 
interconnected. They formed a boundary of roughly 200 kilometers of posts, fortresses, and 
garrisons.37  
The boundary line signified the steadily increasing Vietnamese presence in the 
previously Khmer landscape. It delimited a claimed and protected space that cut through the 
Khmer world. The edge of the Vietnamese political space was moving from Gia Định and Biên 
Hòa in the seventeenth century to the modern-day borderline in the mid-nineteenth century. This 
land boundary was effectively linked to islands in the Gulf of Siam. In 1835, the governor of Hà 
Tiên requested authorization to integrate thirteen islands into its jurisdiction; most important 
among those were Phú Quốc and Thổ Châu.38 The emperor ordered a detailed survey of the 
islands off Hà Tiên, with an analysis of their strategic position, population size, distance from 
the coasts, and location on maps, so that military stations could be set up. While most of these 
places remained uninhabited until the late nineteenth century, Phú Quốc included twelve villages 
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and played an important role in guarding the sea entrance to Hà Tiên and the lower Mekong. It 
had two military posts with a sizable number of cannons and several hundred soldiers.39 Phú 
Quốc and other islands thus formed a protective barrier at sea from any Siamese threat. 
 
Negotiating Huế’s Geographies at the Frontier  
For all of these successes, both Minh Mệnh and Thiệu Trị were ultimately unable to 
bring Cambodia into the empire’s maps. In the end, it was not civilizational geography but a 
practical military mindset and limited state capacity that would shape the southwestern boundary.  
When Huế replaced the Cambodian monarchy with its own administrative system in 1834, the 
new imperial boundary came close to the Siamese domain, but the hope of turning Cambodian 
people into “civilized” subjects so that they would not be used by Bangkok against Vietnam was 
not realizable. It proved impossible to maintain a large army in Phnom Penh. Although only 120 
kilometers separated Châu Đốc and Phnom Penh, there was no overland route between the two 
until 1835. While both Hà Tiên and An Giang depended heavily on rice and copper coins sent 
from Gia Định, they now had to provide supplies for the dispatched army. Each military 
campaign was costly for Huế because rice and cash had to be transported from Gia Định to the 
frontier for the Vietnamese troops, officials, and the Cambodian followers.40 In 1833, the rice 
levy in Hà Tiên was about 1000 hộc, insufficient even for local consumption.41 In 1837 alone, 
An Giang ordered 50,000 hộc of rice and 50,000 strings of cash (quan) to send to an army in 
Phnom Penh. Such amounts were sent to the frontier almost annually. An 1840 memorial asked 
the court to send 20,000 quan of copper and 20,000 phương of rice to Phnom Penh, with another 
30,000 quan and 50,000 phương of rice kept in reserve in An Giang. A second request from 
Phnom Penh that same year planned for more than 105,700 quan and 76,700 phương of rice to 
be stored in An Giang.42 
More significantly, the annexation of Cambodia caused severe conflict with the Khmer 
populations on both sides of the Vĩnh Tế canal. Their interpretation of political geography was 
not based on direct rule, assimilation, taxation, population registration, labor conscription, and 
techniques of administration (Chandler 1975, 20). These were all civilizational standards for the 
Vietnamese, but they were meaningless to the Khmer. When Khmer workers were deemed slow, 
the Vietnamese beat them “like cats, dogs, cows, or buffaloes” (Chandler 2008, 38). Their 
furious responses tested Huế’s comprehension of its civilizational project and the practicability 
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of moral geography. Imperial patience toward these “new subjects” was also put to the test. 
Minh Mệnh complained to the Privy Council: 
 
Thổ people [Cambodians] are incontrollable: at times they submit; at times they 
rebel, they are unpredictable. Last year, they endured several sackings and 
massacres by Siamese troops. Their land was bare. [I] look after them; the court 
dispatched an army to repel the enemy, saved them from despair and issued them 
blankets. Why then did they become hostile and turn into enemies of the Kinh 
[Vietnamese], and carry out massacres?43 
   
Such frustrations unleashed a huge debate in Huế. Both civilizing mission and territorial 
expansion were invoked in support of moving beyond the Vĩnh Tế canal. Eventually, the 
practical voices of frontier generals and officials prevailed over the rhetoric of moral 
righteousness and civilizing mission. The frontier civilian and military officials read the politics 
of space differently, from a more pragmatic perspective than that of the majority of court 
officials. When a group of court censors suggested withdrawal from Cambodia, Thiệu Trị at first 
responded angrily that he could not leave his frontier subjects unprotected from barbarian 
invasion and raids.44 However, consultation with military personnel finally convinced him 
otherwise. He ordered the withdrawal the following year and justified his decision by claiming 
that he did not want people “who are valuable to suffer for the sake of an insignificant thing, 
which is land.”45 The most recognizable result of the debate was the Vietnamese withdrawal to 
the defensive geography that had been constructed between the 1810s and the 1830s. 
The withdrawal affected the contours of the Vietnamese western boundary. In Cambodia, 
both Bangkok and Phnom Penh posed a military threat to southern Vietnam and called for 
Nguyễn enforcement of the defensive line. In Hà Tiên alone, the military commissioner asked 
for 1,500 additional soldiers and established two more garrisons along the Vĩnh Tế canal, where 
2,700 soldiers were already stationed. This helped to solidify the boundary and allowed more 
demographic mobilization under military protection. Having failed to gain a decisive victory 
over Cambodia, Huế agreed to enter negotiations and offered the Khmer king a tributary title in 
1847. This time, most of Thiệu Trị’s officials expressed little interest in either land annexation 
or civilizing mission: “If they revolt, use force; if they submit, use mercy.”46 His frontier 
commanders in particular played a significant role in the Cambodian solution by recalling its 
political status and recognizing the boundary formed by Hà Tiên, Vĩnh Tế, and Châu Đốc. They 
convinced the court that the Khmers were not ideal subjects for a moral geography and that a 
sustainable boundary should be accepted for the purpose of Vietnamese self-protection: 
Vũ Đức Liêm 93 
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 20 (September 2016) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-20) 
 
 
Even if today there is peace, there is no guarantee that another day will be free of 
trouble. There may be no end to the need to use the military. In addition, the dry 
season is approaching; the lack of water and the heat are severe. Many get sick 
and tired; thus prolonging the situation is without benefit…. It is not difficult to 
attack, but to maintain [Cambodia] is. The whole Western Commandery was the 
country of Cambodian barbarians. They mostly are wayward, cunning, 
untrustworthy, and unpredictable. Although they were included in previous maps, 
they belonged there merely in name.… Although we want to rally them and settle 
them in peace, their distrustful character cannot be relied upon. To do as before; 
that is, annexing them into our districts and prefectures and recruiting them into 
the army, is impossible.47 
 
The court yielded to military advice and turned its attention to defending a landscape limited by 
the newly constructed boundary.  
 
Mapping Vietnameseness 
Cartography was a powerful geopolitical discourse in precolonial Vietnam. Because of 
continuous geographic expansion, visualizing space and comprehending geography were great 
concerns in Vietnamese political thought. Nguyễn imperial maps drawn between the 1830s and 
the 1860s show various geographical elements, including rivers (giang), mountains (sơn), walled 
citadels and administrative centers (marked by boxed-in names on the maps), islands, estuaries 
(hải môn), and military stations (tấn, bảo). Among these significant components was “boundary” 
(giới), which sometimes was marked by dotted and solid lines across rivers and mountains.48 
Cartographical representations of the southern provinces were marked with “Cambodian 
boundary/limit” (Cao Miên giới).49 This might support the idea that a “state boundary” between 
Vietnam and Cambodia existed in the Nguyễn geographical perception. “Border” (giới or địa 
giới), however, was used for both provincial and “national” boundaries, with no special 
cartographical differentiation. Thus, maps of Hà Tiên and An Giang in the Comprehensive Maps 
of the Unified Great South (Đại Nam Nhất Thống Toàn Đồ, 1861a) referred to both the “Khmer 
boundary” (Cao Man giới) to the west and the north and the “boundary of Định Tường Province” 
(Định Tường giới) to the east.50 
Thus, the boundary with Cambodia was deemed no more significant than the boundary 
between adjacent Vietnamese provinces. From this perspective, the Vietnamese army did not 
“cross the state boundary” because Cambodia did not lie beyond the boundary but within it. 
After 1847, when Huế’s interest shifted to putting down local resistance east of Vĩnh Tế, the 
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Nguyễn accepted that Cambodia was to be excluded from their administrative geography. 
Imperial cartography reflected this geographical evolution. A map included in the Complete 
Maps of Unified Đại Nam (Đại Nam Nhất Thống Dư Đồ 1861a), probably produced during the 
reigns of Minh Mệnh and Thiệu Trị, showed the annexation of Cambodia to the Khmer land 
labeled as Western Commandery, which comprised two prefectures (Hải Đông and Hải Tây).51 
On another map in the same collection, however, Cambodia appeared as a separate kingdom 
(Cao Man quốc) bordered by Hà Tiên and An Giang Provinces (see maps 2 and 3).52 In these 
maps, the space labeled as Cambodia is left empty; only Vietnameseness is of interest and is 




Map 2. Map of Hà Tiên Province. Source: Đại Nam Nhất Thống Dư Đồ (1861a, EFEO 
microfilm, A. 68, 170b). 
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Map 3. Map of An Giang Province. Source: Đại Nam Nhất Thống Dư Đồ (1861b, EFEO 
microfilm, A. 1600, 76a). 
 
These two maps of Hà Tiên and An Giang belonging to two different collections (both 
with prefaces written in 1861) present a fairly realistic description of the terrain and human 
landscape, clearly demonstrating a relatively comprehensive geographical knowledge of the 
lower Mekong, including mountains, rivers, guarded posts, and estuaries.53 Since these two 
provinces bordered Cambodia, the boundary was drawn in different legends. The Cambodian–
Hà Tiên border was represented (see map 2) by a dotted line starting from Cần Bột estuary, 
while the Cambodian–An Giang border was represented by a solid line across the Mekong (see 
map 3). A similar solid line was also used to mark the boundary between An Giang and Hà Tiên. 
This inconsistency suggests that although the idea of boundaries and their visual representation 
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already existed, they were in the process of being drawn both in physical reality and 
cartographical demonstration on maps.  
While Vietnam was in the process of labeling its space with realistic and detailed 
borderlines in the nineteenth century, the recognition of a state boundary can be traced back to 
the Lý and Trần dynasties (1010–1400). The concept of giới appeared in Đại Việt Sử Ký toàn 
thư ( Đại Việt Sử Ký Toàn Thư 1984) in entries indicating Đại Việt’s southern frontier in the 
eleventh century; however, a detailed visualization of boundaries was not provided until the 
mid-nineteenth century. Historian Nicholas Tarling suggested that border making emerged under 
colonial rule, and borders were designed simply to avoid conflict among the Western powers 
(2001, 44). Such a perspective, while acknowledging the role of Western institutions, 
underestimates local factors. I argue that this new cartographical element predated the 
introduction of Western map-making techniques and was a response to the need for frontier 
management.54 
 
Conclusion: Boundary Making in Nineteenth-Century Vietnam  
Over the nearly one hundred years since five Khmer prefectures were annexed to Hà 
Tiên in 1755, Vietnamese political boundaries moved westward. Frequent rhetorical shifts 
between civilizational frontier and state boundary characterized the Nguyễn intervention in 
Cambodia. Each time the language changed, so did the imagined geography. Cartographical 
collections made reference to both geographical imaginations. Through warfare and state 
making, a solid boundary emerged within that frontier and was enforced by Vietnamese military 
garrisons, civilian settlements, and canals. The Nguyễn utilized the boundary to promote state 
institutionalization, military advance into Cambodia, and a defensive line to repulse Siamese 
attacks.  
In the end, that boundary was the negotiating ground not only among Vietnam, Siam, 
and Cambodia, but also among different Nguyễn conceptions of geography. In February 1847, 
Vietnamese troops withdrew from Phnom Penh for the last time after seeking for more than a 
decade to impose direct rule over the land. Despite the fact that no concrete national boundary 
appeared on precolonial Vietnamese maps, that boundary eventually formed the basis for the 
borderline between French Cochinchina and Cambodia. The canal that had figured as both 
conduit for Vietnamese penetration into the Khmer land and bulwark against Siamese expansion 
and Khmer rebellions became part of the new legal boundary. The process of recognizing 
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geographical status, producing subjects, demarcating boundaries, and translating those 
recognitions into cartography was a worldwide phenomenon of the nineteenth century (Axel 
2002). Such an anthology of radical change facilitated different aspects of modernity, including 
the introduction of fixed state boundaries. In the Asian context, this was not always a 
consequence of local–Western interaction; in the Vietnamese case, it resulted from a non-
European process of frontier management that included labeling terrain, classifying imperial 
ethnography, expanding state infrastructure and administration, and consolidating 
territorialization (Choi 2009).55 That the boundary established in the nineteenth century could be 
even more easily transgressed in the twentieth than it had been then is a permanent feature of the 
mixed natural and multiethnic human landscape.  
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